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DESIGNING A PATTERN, DARKLY
Justin (Gus) Hurwitz *
There is growing academic, regulatory, and legislative interest
in “dark patterns”—digital design practices that influence user
behavior in ways that may not align with users’ interests. For
instance, websites may present information in ways that influence
user decisions, or use design elements that make it easier for users
to engage in one behavior (e.g., purchasing the items in a shopping
cart) than another (e.g., reviewing the items in that shopping cart).
The general thrust of this interest is that dark patterns are
problematic and require regulatory or legislative action.
While acknowledging that many concerns about dark patterns
are legitimate, this Article discusses the more nuanced reality about
“patterns,” that design is, simply, hard. All design influences user
behavior, sometimes in positive ways, sometimes in negative,
sometimes deliberately, sometimes not. This Article argues for a
more cautionary approach to addressing the concerns of dark
patterns. The most problematic uses of dark patterns almost
certainly run afoul of existing consumer protection law. That
authority––not new, broader rules—should be the first recourse to
addressing these concerns. Beyond that, this is an area where the
marketplace––including the design professionals working to
improve User Interface and User Experience design practices––
should be allowed to continue to develop, but with the
understanding that Congress and regulators have a keen interest in
ensuring that consumer interests are reflected in those practices.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
“Dark pattern” is a new term for an old practice: using design to
prompt desired (not necessarily desirable) behavior.1 For instance, a
website may present terms of fservice or an upgrade offer in a
window that is more difficult to cancel than it is to accept.2 A
1

DARK PATTERNS, https://www.darkpatterns.org/ [https://perma.cc/4N4F-RRPR]
(last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
2
Richard Thaler, The Power of Nudges, for Good and Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/upshot/the-power-of-nudgesfor-good-and-bad.html [https://perma.cc/N3E3-ST34] (discussing examples of
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website might, possibly falsely, report to a user that many other
users have made a similar purchase recently or that only a limited
number of units of a product remain.3 Consumers worry that a car
salesperson may present add-ons or upgrades at the end of a
high-pressure negotiation, or a supermarket may stock a check-out
aisle with high margin “impulse purchase” items.4 An employer
might offer on-site amenities and perks that make employees
happier, but that also result in spending more time on the job.5
Subscription services—online and offline—may run customers
through a “maze” of customer service representatives to cancel
service.6 A social-media platform may make it easy and rewarding
to uncritically “share” posts, facilitating the widespread
dissemination of false information.7
These practices have the potential to harm consumers. Indeed,
some of them amount to outright fraud. Others may be prohibited by
other laws or regulations, such as Section 5 of the Federal Trade

website options that defaulted to “accept” and had difficult requirements to cancel
a subscription).
3
Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11k
Shopping Websites, 3 PRO. OF THE ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 81,
81:5 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07032.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CTR-H259].
4
But see Mario J. Miranda, Determinants of Shoppers’ Checkout Behaviour at
Supermarkets, 16 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR MKTG. 312,
319 (2008) (“[S]hoppers’ purchases at grocery checkouts may not be spontaneous
and unreflective . . . but demonstrative of conscious concern with making efficient
use of their shopping time. Not all purchases at checkouts can therefore be
casually referred to as impulse purchase.”).
5
Mike Elgan, Latest ‘Coworking’ Services Combine Remote Offices,
Transportation, EWEEK (May 15, 2016), https://www.eweek.com/mobile/latestcoworking-services-combine-remote-offices-transportation
[https://perma.cc/5B64-XS95]; Gary Anthes et al., The Right Mix, 38
COMPUTERWORLD 24 (June 14, 2004).
6
THALER, supra note 2.
7
See Alex Kantrowitz, The Man Who Built the Retweet: “We Handed a Loaded
Weapon to 4-Year-Olds,” BUZZFEED (July 23, 2019, 4:05 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alexkantrowitz/how-the-retweet-ruinedthe-internet [https://perma.cc/2Y7C-2LD9]; see also Soroush Vosoughi et al., The
Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SOC. SCI. 1146 (2018).
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Commission Act.8 Others may not run afoul of any existing law.
Some of them may not even be all that likely to harm consumers—
and some may even be beneficial to consumers. The ambiguity
regarding the legality, potential harm, and possible benefits of dark
patterns has given rise to some discussion.
In January 2020, the author of this piece was invited to testify
before the United States House of Representatives Energy and
Commerce Committee’s Consumer Protection subcommittee on the
topic of dark patterns.9 This Article revises and expands upon the
written testimony prepared for that hearing.10 The hearing itself was
on the topic of “manipulation and deception in the digital age,” and
focused specifically on three topics: deep and cheap fakes
(generally, videos manipulated to present false or misleading
information), dark patterns (generally, interfaces designed to
manipulate users into certain courses of conduct), and social media
bots (generally, automated accounts on social media designed to
produce or promote certain types of information).
The testimony and this Article focus on dark patterns, describing
the difficulties inherent in designing interfaces and of understanding
the effects of design decisions as well as the risks that regulation of
purportedly “dark” design decisions (that is, those that are harmful
to consumers) will make all design more difficult (thereby harming
consumers). Further, the author’s comments in both avenues also
suggest potential regulatory tools for addressing the very real risks
that dark patterns can pose to consumers. This Article begins in Part
II by situating concern about dark patterns within the broader
context of the hearing, and generally of concerns about online mis8

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are
hereby declared unlawful.”).
9
Americans at Risk: Manipulation and Deception in The Digital Age: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Com. of the Comm. on Energy and
Com., House Comm. On Energy & Com., 116th Cong. (Jan. 8, 2020, 10:30 AM)
[hereinafter
Hearings]
(statement
of
Justin
“Gus”
Hurwitz),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/
committee-activity/hearings/hearing-onamericans-at-risk-manipulation-and-deception-in-the-digital
[https://perma.cc/9R92-P5HM].
10
See id.
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and dis-information. This discussion also reflects upon aspects of
the hearing itself that relate to the topic––the very structure of
Congressional hearings embeds patterns that affect their function as
a vehicle for Congressional information gathering. Part III presents
a general discussion of dark patterns, offering a more formal
discussion of what they are and how the effects of design decisions
on consumers can be bad (that is, “dark”), ambiguous, or even good.
Part VI gets into the weeds of design, explaining the challenges of
design in terms of the mathematical theory of complexity. And Part
V considers approaches to addressing the concerns of dark patterns,
from relying on competition and self-regulation, to the use of
existing regulatory authority such as the Federal Trade
Commission’s (“FTC”) authority to act against Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices, to more modern mechanisms such as
using the same technological features that make dark patterns
concerning as tools to counteract those concerns.
II.

SITUATING DARK PATTERNS IN THE PANTHEON OF
MIS- AND DIS-INFORMATION

Hello, ladies, look at your man, now back to me, now back at your man,
now back to me. Sadly, he isn’t me . . . . Look down, back up, where are
you? You’re on a boat with the man your man could smell like. What’s
in your hand, back at me. I have it, it’s an oyster with two tickets to that
thing you love. Look again, the tickets are now diamonds. Anything is
possible when your man smells like Old Spice and not a lady. I’m on a
horse.
- The Man Your Man Could Smell Like11

A. Dark Patterns, the Gist
The basic idea of dark patterns is straightforward: humans are
not perfectly rational decision-makers.12 Rather, humans constantly

11

Old Spice, The Man Your Man Could Smell Like, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=owGykVbfgUE [https://perma.cc/HMR7GZ2T].
12
See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS xx (2008) (observing that “we are not only irrational,
but predictably irrational”); RICHARD H. THALER ET AL., NUDGE: IMPROVING
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use various heuristics to efficiently make decisions subject to
imperfect information. These heuristics can be turned against users,
however, and used, to some extent, to “program” them for specific
behavior.13
There is a myriad of common examples of these cognitive
biases. However, dark patterns present a case where it may be easier
to show than to tell: the images at the top of the next page
demonstrate simple “dark patterns” at work.
As these images demonstrate, there are patterns in how users
interact with information. Designers study these patterns and can use
them to present information in ways that influence how users
respond to that information. Designers may present information in a
manner that follows the flow of how readers or users are likely to
naturally process it; or in a way that highlights details that may be
easily missed; or by “hiding” information despite it being plainly
disclosed.
The first image14 takes advantage of how humans scan
information in an image or on a page. In the first image, design is
used to make the reader feel like they are being controlled by the
image. While the presentation is in a somewhat jocular or didactic
manner, it may nonetheless leave some readers perplexed or even
feeling manipulated. It is, in a sense, a text-based version of the
advertisement quoted at the beginning of this section––a popular
advertisement for Old Spice in which the actor instructs the viewer:
“[l]adies, look at your man, now back to me, now back at your man,
now back to me. . . . Look down, back up, where are you? You’re
on a boat with the man your man could smell like.”15 The design of
that ad, both in terms of the script and the cinematography, gives the
viewer a sense of being manipulated–again in a jocular way–that is
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (explaining the
nature of irrational consumers).
13
See THALER, supra note 12; see also BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER,
RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 11 (2018) (discussing the means by which “technosocial engineering programs our behavior”).
14
Zer0Effect, And You Will Read This at the End, REDDIT (2019),
https://www.reddit.com/r/dankmemes/comments/apcf4f/and_you_will_read_this
_at_the_end/ [https://perma.cc/3SBX-E4E9].
15
Old Spice, supra note 11.
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useful in portraying Old Spice deodorant (the product being
advertised) as a source of confidence.

The second image is somewhat more nefarious,16 even if
innocuously so. It contains errors that most readers’ brains will
automatically correct and skip over as they are read and plays with
the reader by calling attention to these overlooked errors. Imagine
if, instead of minor typos or grammatical errors, this image had
“tricked” the reader into accepting substantive errors, such as the
inclusion or omission of the word “not,” or an extra digit in the price
of a product. Patterns like these could be used to “trick” users into
accepting terms or disclosing information, ostensibly, knowingly.
While there is nothing terribly new about merchants shaping the
customer experience to their own advantage, new attention has been
paid in recent years to practices like these when used in the online
environment. First, given the name “dark patterns” at the beginning
of the last decade, concern about these practices has grown in the
academic literature and popular press in recent years.17 The

16

MEMEPRO1, If You Did it Great!, REDDIT IMAGEFLIP (2018),
https://imgflip.com/i/225k37 [https://perma.cc/DSH3-TL6Z].
17
See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
995, 1005 (2014); Paul Ohm, Forthright Code, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 473 (2018);
Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 632 (2019) [hereinafter Waldman, Power]; FRISCHMANN
& SELINGER, supra note 13.
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phenomenon has also increasingly gained legislative attention.18
Recently, attention has been driven particularly by concerns of the
privacy community about the effectiveness of privacy disclosures
and notice-and-consent requirements about mis- and disinformation.19
B. Dark Patterns as Mis- and Dis-information
Dark patterns are often discussed alongside, or as a form of,
online mis- and dis-information.20 Importantly, dark patterns are
meaningfully different from most other forms of mis- and disinformation––to the point that it is problematic to discuss them as
though they were species within the same genus of concern. The
concern about dark patterns is that firms may design websites in
ways that adversely affect their users––that is, about manipulation
that affects a first-party relationship. However, cheap- and
deep-fakes, and social media bots, are designed to affect third-party
relationships. They are intended to affect how those exposed to their
content think about other parties of individuals––for instance, to
embarrass a public figure or influence public debate.
It is remarkable that these different concepts would be grouped
together under a heading on manipulation and deception in the
digital age. Their underlying concerns and likely policy responses
to each share little in common. While all can colorably be
considered under a common rubric of manipulation and
disinformation, grouping these concepts in this way suggests a
greater similarity between them than really exists. Grouping
18

See, e.g., Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act (DETOUR
Act), S.1084, 116th Cong. (2019).
19
See Waldman, Power, supra note 17; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of
Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239, 1247 (2019); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in
Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries 42 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1057, 1071 (2019); Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2019); Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz & Jamie Luguri, Consumertarian Default Rules, 82 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 154 (2019); Ohm, supra note 17; Lauren E. Willis, Why
not Privacy by Default, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 68 (2014); FRISCHMANN &
SELINGER, supra note 13.
20
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9 (discussing dark patterns alongside other
topics such as cheap and deep fakes).
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concepts such as deep fakes and dark patterns together could itself
be considered a form of manipulation or deception, using the
concerns raised by each to create a greater specter of concern than
would otherwise exist.
C. The Curious Case of Congressional Testimony
As noted above, the origin of this Article was Congressional
testimony on the general topic of “manipulation and deception in the
digital age.” It is worth reflecting on the spectacle of Congressional
testimony itself as a useful lens for thinking about dark patterns. The
observation above, that the structure of the hearing at which the
earlier version of this Article was presented––the artificial grouping
of three distinct forms of potentially problematic online conduct
under a unified heading of manipulation and deception––could itself
be considered a form of manipulation or deception leads to some
broader reflections on the nature of the Subcommittee hearing
process. The entire structure of Congressional testimony is designed
to elicit certain types of discussion. It would take a special sort of
naiveté to believe the purpose of a hearing is to provide useful
information to Congress or to engage in a probing search for truth.
To the contrary, the structure of the hearing, in which each
participant is given short windows in which to either make
statements or ask questions, all but makes it impossible for any issue
to be explored in detail or any ideas to be interrogated in depth.
Rather, the nature of the Congressional hearing is performative,
providing each member a five-minute opportunity for structured
colloquy with the witnesses.21 This time may be used in various
ways, from making statements to dialoguing with individual
witnesses, or asking the entire panel of witnesses to respond––
typically with a yes or no answer––to a question. In any event, the
game is obvious to those who have played it: each member of
21
As recently explained by a United States Senator: “Most of what happens in
committee hearings isn’t oversight, it’s showmanship. Senators make speeches
that get chopped up, shipped to home-state TV stations, and blasted across social
media. They aren’t trying to learn from witnesses, uncover details, or improve
legislation. They’re competing for sound bites.” Ben Sasse, Make the Senate
Great Again, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/make-the-senate-greatagain-11599589142 [https://perma.cc/UNC2-GZ7X].
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Congress comes to a hearing with their own agenda, and the hearing
provides them an opportunity to introduce materials into the
record—be it the written record or the recorded video––in support
of that agenda.
Hearings need not be designed this way. When Congress, either
as individual members or an institution, wants to learn about a topic,
it has better mechanisms than the public spectacle of a hearing. The
purpose of a public hearing is precisely the spectacle of the thing––
the opportunity it creates for grandstanding, creating soundbites, and
prompting useful statements from Congressionally-certified
experts. To this end, they are deliberately designed to be amenable
to this purpose.
The foregoing aspects of a Congressional hearing’s design
makes testifying in a hearing about dark patterns––and, for that
matter, mis- and dis-information generally––a curiously ironic
experience. Throughout the hearing, it was unclear whether those in
the room could tell how often the discussion addressed the patterns
that were on display in real time.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the hearing, however, related to the
topic of cheap fakes. Cheap fakes generally refer to videos edited to
present the source material to portray a narrative different from the
original source content. For instance, a video in which content is
selectively edited, or the way in which it is played back is altered,
would be a cheap fake. Examples such as using out-of-context
excerpts from a recording of presidential candidate’s town hall, or
altering the playback-speed of a recording to make the speaker
sound intoxicated, are demonstrations of cheap fakes.22 So too is
altering portions of a video to change its apparent meaning.23
At the beginning of her questioning of witnesses, Subcommittee
Chairwoman Jan Schakowsky referenced her questioning of Mark
Zuckerberg at a prior hearing, noting that “when we had Mark
Zuckerberg here, I did a review of all of the apologies we have had
22

@ubermomocmd, TWITTER (May 23, 2019, 6:25 AM), https://twitter.com/
ubermomocmd/status/1131521526212243457 [https://perma.cc/JW79-M6ZQ].
23
See @shaderunnr, TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:13 PM), https://twitter.com/
shaderunnr/status/1215335927511425024 [https://perma.cc/B3D5-YF6A].
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from him over the years.”24 Had this reference been presented as a
video compilation of various times in which Mr. Zuckerberg
apologized, it would be a canonical example of a cheap fake. Indeed,
such video compilations exist, and have been aired as part of news
programs.25
The point of this discussion is not to criticize or express concern
about the Subcommittee or its hearing process. To the contrary, the
hearing process serves valuable purposes. And while hearings may
not be particularly effective tools for information discovery, they are
nonetheless important tools for incorporating information into the
democratic process. The lesson from this discussion is that dark
patterns––as well as other tools that can be associated with mis- or
dis-information––can, in fact, serve valuable informational
purposes. And more poignantly, that before Congress decides to
regulate the speech practices of others, it would be advised to look
to its own practices for guidance.
III.

DARK PATTERNS: DEFINING THE CONCERN

A. What are Dark Patterns?
First coined in 2010,26 the term “dark patterns” was created to
describe user interface design patterns that are “crafted with great
attention to detail, and a solid understanding of human psychology,
to trick users into do[ing] things they wouldn’t otherwise have
done.”27
The term is used primarily to describe user interface design
choices intended to invoke a particular behavior (usually to the
benefit of the designer and/or the designer’s employer). Many, if not
most, examples have offline analogs. But the arguably unique thing
24

Hearings, supra note 9 (testimony of Monika Bickert).
CBS This Morning, Timeline of Mark Zuckerberg’s Apologies, YOUTUBE (Apr.
11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHah9agzXfs [https://perma.cc/8BZL5S32].
26
Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Dirty Tricks Designers Use to Make People
Do Stuff, 90 PERCENT OF EVERYTHING (July 8, 2010), https://www.
90percentofeverything.com/2010/07/08/dark-patterns-dirty-tricks-designers-useto-make-people-do-stuff/ [https://perma.cc/T8KY-PRVC].
27
Id.
25

68

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 1

about dark patterns is that software interfaces to online platforms are
infinitely and instantly malleable. There is practically no limit to
design choices, and those design choices can be changed, tweaked,
updated, and targeted with ease––including in real-time and in
response to specific users or user actions. The limitations of dark
patterns online are inherently different from those in more
traditional sales channels. For instance, a supermarket checkout
aisle needs to be roughly a constant size, needs to target the average
customer insofar as is impracticable to send customers to different
aisles based on, e.g., their buying history, can only fit so many
products on the shelves, and cannot be easily changed outside of a
set schedule.
Another unique aspect of dark patterns is that, sometimes, the
underlying code is available. So, for instance, if a webpage is
targeting different interfaces to different users using browser-side
techniques, the underlying code can be inspected. Similarly, online
interfaces are typically used from the relative comfort of one’s home
or office, or while out and about on one’s mobile device. Both of
these factors give users greater control over how they choose to
interact with an interface than is possible in many offline settings.
Dark patterns take advantage of a few key behaviors of
imperfectly rational humans. First, people are unwilling to devote a
large amount of cognitive resources to relatively low value
activities. As such, people skim when they read, often missing some
details—particularly those that may be designed in a way that makes
them relatively easier to miss. People’s eyes follow common
patterns when reading text on a screen or page, as a result of how
salient information has been presented in their prior experiences.28
Second, if there is a cost to correct a mistake, people may just accept
the mistake if the cost in time or effort exceeds the cost of continuing
on their present course. Few people will take the time to return a
product for a $2.00 refund, even if that product was shipped to them
(and they were charged for it) in error (or fraud). Third, people are
social creatures and frequently rely on the behavior of others to
A search on Amazon.com for books on “eye tracking,” for instance, yields
dozens of results. Results for “Eye Tracking,” AMAZON, https://www.
amazon.com/s?k=eye+tracking&ref=nb_sb_noss_2 (last visited Aug. 22, 2020).
28
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guide their own conduct. Thus, when presented with information
such as “Bonnie in New Jersey recently purchased item X” or “12
other people are looking at this deal right now,” consumers will
potentially feel an elevated sense of pressure to commit to a
purchase. This heuristic, sometimes referred to as “social proof,”
can be understood as entirely rational, reflecting the wisdom of the
crowd; but it can also be taken advantage of to present a decision as
more desirable than it really is.29
There is no doubt that firms use dark patterns, or that they can
be effective. One recent study analyzed 53,000 different product
pages across 11,000 different online shopping sites, and found 1,818
instances of dark pattern usage.30 In another study, respondents
presented with either a “mild” or “aggressive” dark pattern designed
to push them into purchasing credit monitoring services were 228%
to 371% more likely to purchase the offered services.31
At the same time, and as discussed below, design is, simply put,
hard, and not all “dark” patterns are intentional or malicious. Some
are benign or even beneficial.32 Design decisions are necessary to
any interface and negative effects may be inadvertent or practicably
unavoidable. For example, one of the studies above used screen
shots from the PlayStation live service and its promotion of a
12-month subscription over the 1-month option by using larger text
for the former to demonstrate a deceptive dark pattern.33 But,
considering the large volume of gamers that use that service, it may
29
See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
PERSUASION (Harper Bus. rev. ed. 2006). Indeed, the term “social proof,” is
generally traced to Robert Cialdini’s 1984 book INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF PERSUASION, one of the seminal books on the psychology of persuasion and
marketing.
30
Mathur, supra note 3.
31
Jamie Luguri & Lior Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns 22 (Univ.
of Chic. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 719, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431205 [https://perma.cc/P2NA-CLJP].
32
See Jonathan Cribb & Carl Emmerson, What Happens When Employers Are
Obliged to Nudge? Automatic Enrolment and Pension Savings in the UK 34 (Inst.
Fiscal Stud., Working Paper No. 1619, 2016), https://www.ifs.org.uk/
uploads/wp1619.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDN3-MUJB] (finding that automatic
enrollment in pension programs lead to large increases in savings by employees).
33
See Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 31, at 13–17.
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simply be the case that the annual savings and convenience of not
having to subscribe monthly benefits one group of users, even
though it may be annoying or undesirable to a second set of users.
In other words, using larger text sizes to make the option most
desired by most users easier to find, while leaving the alternate
option available on the same page for users who prefer it, may be
the preferred design for most users. Further, designs intended to
bring about certain effects may be ineffective, and intended effects
may be beneficial––for example, reminding users of abandoned
shopping carts and reminding users of necessary complementary
products may confer a benefit on both the seller (more sales) and the
buyer (purchasing desired products). It may be the case that the
annoyance of being “pushed” to purchase items in a cart, or to buy
items related to those in a cart, is relatively minor, even spread
across thousands of users, to avoid a greater inconvenience for users
who fail to click the final button to complete a purchase, or who are
about to purchase a product only to later discover that they needed
to have purchased complementary goods to use it.
Dark patterns are also nothing new. Indeed, most have existed
in one form or another in the offline world for a long time. Stores
keep candy near registers because it is easier for parents to simply
placate a whining child than to discipline them in a checkout aisle.
Similarly, tabloids art kept near registers to entertain customers and
distract them from the feeling of impatience while waiting to pay.
When purchasing a car at a dealership, the salesperson may
“consult” with a hidden “manager” to make a customer feel he is
getting a good deal. The customer then frequently needs to go
through two or three layers of personnel to finalize the deal, each
time being offered various “upgrades” to the vehicle being
purchased. Homeowners needing contractors for home remodeling,
fence installation, or a major repair will frequently not be able to
receive a price over the phone—even if pricing is relatively
standard—because such companies prefer to send a salesperson to
the premises who can talk the potential customer through objections.
These are all common “tricks” of the sales trade. These tricks
are patterns of doing business that allow firms to generate more
revenue from customers. In some cases, these tricks may be
deceptive or harmful, or at least have no positive social value (as
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opposed to merely transferring wealth from customer to firm). In
other cases, there may be real value to these tricks. A company may
prefer to send contractors to visit customers’ homes because
experience shows customers often do not understand which products
best suit their needs, or have the wrong work done on their houses
to solve a given problem. Sending the contractor to inspect the job
site before giving a quote may allow for better quotes and
performance and, even more importantly, avoids creating unhappy,
or complaining, customers. And in other cases, these tricks may be
a mechanism for price discrimination—sorting customers by their
willingness to pay for a given product. While controversial, the
economics of price discrimination are widely understood and,
generally, legal. The net effect of price discrimination in
competitive markets generally does not increase firm revenues
significantly. Rather, by charging some customers more and keeping
the average price the same, firms are able to offer other customers
lower prices, which can allow them to offer their goods or services
to consumers who may otherwise be priced out of the market.
B. Dark Patterns: the Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous34
Although the literature on dark patterns is relatively new, there
are some readily identifiable patterns which deserve discussion.
What follows is a discussion of some of these common patterns, and
an attempt to differentiate them, along with other examples in terms
of “good,” “bad” and “ambiguous” effects.
1. Bad-effect Design
Websites may use designs to trick consumers into undesired
action. These designs include, for instance, employing things such
as “countdown timers”35 indicating that a customer only has “X”
amount of time remaining to complete a purchase. Using fraudulent
information, website designs may create a needless sense of urgency
that compels a customer to make a purchase that they would not
have made upon less pressured reflection. Sites also employ a
34
Note, these “bad/ambiguous/good” behavior headings are approximate,
meant to offer intuitive examples to demonstrate that design can be good or bad.
35
Mathur et al., supra note 3, at 8:12.
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“limited-time message” or “scarcity message”36 indicating that a
particular deal will only exist for a short period of time, or that the
item is on the verge of selling out. When fraudulent, the artificial
urgency created by countdown timers and similar features is used to
motivate a buyer without need. Upsells, a design that introduces
steps meant to encourage users to purchase an additional good or
service (e.g. insurance for a travel ticket), are also common. When
a design “confirmshames”37 users, it employs a choice interface
(“yes” or “no”) in a way that manipulates a consumer’s emotions.
Thus, instead of just allowing a “no” choice to decline optional
insurance for a vacation, the offered choice may be “No, I don’t
want to protect my valuables and loved ones during my trip.”
Visual interference38 is used to display important text in
obscured or otherwise difficult to see color and layout scheme.39
One-way visual interference manifests online is to offer users
upgrade options in a window that offers them an obvious way to
accept, but obscures how to decline, the offer. The cognitive effect
of this design is that it gives users inclined to decline the offer a few
additional seconds to change their minds, and, because people have
a natural predisposition to ideas that they have encountered recently,
the design may in fact make these users marginally more likely to
do so. Even if the conversion rate is small, if offered immediately
after a sale, this mechanism only has upside revenue potential.
More traditionally, supermarkets manage the length of lines to
generate a sunk-cost bias. Also, as noted above, impulse buy items
36

Id. at 8:16–17.
Id. at 8:17.
38
Id.
39
See Kaitlyn Tiffany, This Instagram Story Ad with a Fake Hair in it is Sort
of Disturbing, THE VERGE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/
tldr/2017/12/11/16763664/sneaker-ad-instagram-stories-swipe-up-trick [https://
perma.cc/ M7LQ-ABVC]. Note, however, that deceptively obtained consent is
ineffective. At times, this pattern goes beyond simple design choices in terms of
font and color, and moves into introducing wholly out of place elements clearly
meant to confuse a user. For example, one shoe retailer placed a picture of a hair
over top of their otherwise legitimate ad in an effort to trick users into swiping up.
Id. Some users, thinking they were ridding their screen of a hair, actually ended
up on the retailer’s website. Id.
37
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are offered alongside the waiting shoppers to encourage them to add
more to their order. Sites sometimes use “sneaking,”40 which
automatically adds items to a shopper’s cart. One of the most classic
examples of off-line manipulative behavior is creating roadblocks
for users to shape their behavior. Typically, these roadblocks take
the form of making it difficult to cancel a service or return a product.
For example, cancelling cell phone service frequently requires
transfers between multiple sales representatives and navigation of
complex phone menus. Cancelling cable or internet services often
requires consumers to go through a similarly circuitous experience.
2. Ambiguous-effect Design
There are a host of behaviors that arguably straddle the line
between benign and unsavory. Websites frequently employ
automated messaging systems that periodically remind browsing
customers of items they left in their carts. Technically unsolicited,
messages such as these may be an annoyance, but may also serve to
remind users of purchases that they want to return to or even thought
that they had completed. Complementary product notices are
similar. To some users, being offered complementary products may
be an annoyance or even induce undesired purchases, but for others
they can provide important information and avoid substantial future
costs. For instance, a site may suggest a customer who is buying a
plumbing fixture also buy Teflon plumbing tape. If the customer is
unaware that Teflon plumbing tape is needed to properly install most
fixtures, this is valuable information that may save the consumer
from having to make a subsequent purchase, or even from
improperly installing the fixture. On the other hand, if the customer
already has such tape, this may be a minor annoyance. Further, if the
suggested product is not actually needed, this suggestion may be
harmful to the customer.
Grocery stores use inconsistent labeling on the price stickers
placed on goods––similar items may have their unit prices
calculated using different units.41 Inconsistent labeling can be
40

Id.
Melanie Pinola, How the Unit Pricing Labels in Stores Can Trick You into
Spending More, LIFEHACKER (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:00 A.M.), https://lifehacker.com/
41
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misleading (making more expensive products appear less
expensive), or just irritating, as it forces consumers to do their own
comparisons and makes pure price competition among vendors
more difficult. Some argue that inconsistent labeling is a devious
mechanism forcing consumers into buying more expensive products
by making it harder for customers to identify which products have
the best prices. It can, however, also be a way of promoting
non-price competition, where consumers are unlikely to compare
the quality of products if their sole focus is price. Indeed, research
suggests that consumers may over-rely on price comparisons as
strong indicators of quality.42
Doctors, dentists, and similar healthcare providers increasingly
insist upon scheduling follow-up appointments at the beginning of
an appointment. Requesting that patients schedule follow-ups before
their initial appointment may pressure patients into scheduling
appointments that they do not need, or more often than they need.
These appointments may even be decided based upon what a
patient’s insurance will cover, not what the patient needs from a
medical or professional perspective––a practice that may increase
overall healthcare costs for everyone in society. On the other hand,
this practice may also make it more likely that needed follow-up
appointments are scheduled, which may be better for patients,
reduce providers’ administrative costs, and reduce overall
healthcare costs for society. It is possible that on average, some
portion of such appointments are wasteful or beneficial—but in any
given case the effects may be either beneficial or harmful.
Arguably, even familiar and widely used user interface elements
such as a “like” button or a “retweet” button represent a degree of
user manipulation, albeit with ambiguous effects. Social networks
are today defined, to some extent, on the degree of reach that
individual users can affect. Much of this reach is measured by user
how-the-unit-pricing-labels-in-stores-can-trick-you-int-1641793755 [https://perma.cc/
K3KZ-5GDF].
42
Dengfeng Yan et al., Package Size and Perceived Quality: The Intervening
Role of Unit Price Perception, 24 J. OF CONSUMER PSYCH. 3, 14 (2014) (finding
that consumers use unit price as a proxy to determine quality when comparing
similarly sized and different sized goods).
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engagement, which is, in turn, driven by activities such as liking and
retweeting.43 These design features were explicit choices meant to
encourage user interaction on the social networks, and thus represent
user manipulation to a degree. The social value of these platforms is
subject to important debate and scrutiny, from their ability to serve
as vectors for and amplifiers of mis- and dis-information and
concerns about potentially addictive behavior patterns.44
Nonetheless, social media has unquestionably been beneficial to
many in society––most often to minority and other disadvantaged
voices that have historically not had access to high-profile
platforms. For those voices, social media has served as a significant
amplifier of their messages, concerns, and ideas—and the design
elements that have allowed these platforms to succeed have allowed
these user groups to benefit from them.
Or, to return to an echo of the PlayStation example used above,
during its regular membership drive, NPR strongly encourages
listeners to become “sustaining members.” That is, NPR wants
listeners to agree to small, automatic, monthly donations instead of
larger, one-time donations. But why should NPR care if a listener
gives $120 once in January or $10 per month over a period of twelve
months? The answer is that this encouragement is a dark pattern. 45
Getting listeners to sign up for the monthly subscription makes it
more likely that they will continue paying long into the future.
Rather than hoping that each year the listener will affirmatively
choose to make a single large donation, the psychological burden is
43

Jeffrey Kranz, 7 Social Media Engagement Metrics for Tracking Followers
and Growing Community, BUFFER (Sept. 21, 2015), https://buffer.com/resources/
measure-social-media-engagement [https://perma.cc/PZ5H-FAKU].
44
See Christian Montag et al., Addictive Features of Social Media/Messenger
Platforms and Freemium Games against the Background of Psychological and
Economic Theories, 16 INT’L. J. ENVTL. RSCH. PUB. HEALTH 2612, 2623 (2019);
Hilary Andersson, Social Media Apps are ‘Deliberately’ Addictive to Users, BBC
NEWS (July 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44640959
[https://perma.cc/RHY4-FQWB].
45
See Priscella Esser, Getting Users’ Long-Term Commitment with a Monthly
Charge, INTERACTION DESIGN FOUNDATION (2018), https://www.interactiondesign.org/literature/article/getting-users-long-term-commitment-with-a-monthlycharge [https://perma.cc/3CDP-RDJ5].
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shifted to the listener to discontinue making small regular donations,
which many are unlikely to do. NPR, of course, is a good, honest,
hardworking news organization with pure motives, so it would never
be criticized for taking advantage of its listeners by tricking them
into emptying their pocketbooks into public broadcasting’s coffers.
But when companies like Microsoft and Adobe use this same
practice,46 it is clearly deceptive.
3. Good-effect Design
Design choices can also obviously be aimed toward good ends.
Apple and Amazon are two of the best examples of carefully
considered design meant to drive positive user experiences. The
so-called “Apple tax,” the price premium that Apple is able to
charge for its products compared to similar-quality products from
other companies, is a reflection of Apple’s reputation for producing
well-designed products.47 Amazon, likewise, to an important degree
made e-commerce accepted and trusted through the great strides it
made in both creating secure environments that customers could
trust, and in removing as much of the friction in the shopping
experience as possible. Its famous “1-click” patent, and the
associated ease with which it designed its checkout experience, was
an important part of that innovation.48
Individual apps that cater to different user lifestyles also
introduce design choices—often using the same techniques derided
as manipulative in the social media context—to encourage, for
example, healthier lifestyles. Apple’s watch has a built-in app that
reminds users to breathe deeply periodically,49 and an app that
46
Id. Lest the dripping irony be lost, the effects of these practices in the cases
of both NPR and commercial entities like Microsoft and Adobe are ambiguous,
with both positive and negative effects for different groups of users.
47
Kevin Downey, Why are Apple Products so Friggin’ Expensive?,
KIMKOMANDO (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.komando.com/money-tips/why-areapple-products-so-friggin-expensive/549472/ [https://perma.cc/L89X-GLUM].
48
Why Amazon’s ‘1-Click’ Ordering Was a Game Changer,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 14, 2017), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article/amazons-1-click-goes-off-patent/# [https://perma.cc/86R6-38QN].
49
Lucy Hattersley, What is Breath for Apple Watch ǀ How to use Apple Breathe
app in watchOS3, MACWORLD (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.macworld.co.uk/
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reminds users to stand up and walk around once an hour to combat
the problems associated with modern work habits.50 Other apps help
dieters remember when they are allowed to eat, encourage them to
make healthier choices, and to drink enough water.
IV.
THE DARK TRUTH: DESIGN IS HARD
Design is difficult. It is also necessary. A car must have a
mechanism for steering, which must be located somewhere and be
articulated in a certain manner. Design choices will affect how easy
it is to operate the car, how responsive the car is to the driver and to
road conditions, and how safely the car can be operated. Design
decisions will affect the aesthetics of the car, how comfortable the
car is, and the cost of manufacturing the car. Indeed, the decision of
whether to invest significantly in research and development relating
to the car’s steering mechanisms will affect the cost, quality, and
safety of the car.
Things just get more complicated from there. If regulators want
to ensure the safety of cars, they need to design systems for
measuring, monitoring, and enforcing safety metrics. If, for
instance, regulators use crash test dummies modeled after the typical
male driver, car manufacturers will design cars that are safe for
typical male drivers––and possibly unsafe for female drivers.51
Design, in other words, is difficult.
A. . . . it’s Complicated
In some systems, including nearly all software-based systems,
design is more than just difficult, it is “complicated.” Complex
systems are systems with many interconnected parts, in which
changes to any one of those parts can affect other parts, often in
feature/iphone/what-is-breathe-for-apple-watch-how-use-apple-breathe-app-inwatchos-3-3643692/ [https://perma.cc/FBD4-V8C7].
50
Close Your Rings, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/watch/close-your-rings/
[https://perma.cc/47NB-7F7R] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).
51
This is a topic that has been discussed extensively in recent years. See, e.g.,
Astrid Linder & Mats Svensson, Road Safety: The Average Male as a Norm in
Vehicle Occupant Crash Safety Assessment, 44 INTERDISC. SCI. REVS. 140, 140
(2019).
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unexpected and hard to understand ways. The measure of
complexity in these systems is said to grow polynomially,
exponentially, or even factorially in proportion to the total number
of components in the system.52 In other words, doubling the number
of components in a system from five to ten may increase the overall
complexity––the possible number of interactions between those
components––by a factor of over 30,000.53
One of the primary goals of “design” is to reduce complexity.
Complexity is primarily controlled by reducing the number of
possible interactions between the components of a system––and
this, in turn, means reducing the overall functionality of the system.
The challenge is figuring out which functionality to excise and
which to retain. Sometimes, reducing overall system complexity can
even entail adding new components. For instance, a system can be
designed with a “basic” or “default” mode in which users cannot
change most settings, but can also have an additional “advanced”
mode in which users have greater control. Designing such a system
requires developing two separate interfaces, a way to switch
between them, and user education on this multi-interface system.
Complexity abounds, often with tragic results. The Three Mile
Island disaster is a classic example––perhaps the most famous. As
described by the Washington Post following the disaster, “[t]he
[Three Mile Island] control room is a vision from science fiction. It
sits under the shadow of the 190-foot-high domed reactor
containment building. Inside, a horseshoe-shaped panel stretches 40
feet along three walls lined with dials, gauges and 1,200 warning
lights color-coded red and green.”54 All of those dials, gauges, and
warning lights were working well when the disaster occurred. They
presented, however, too much information to be useful, and did so
in a way that could not be useful, in the event of a real-time
52

See Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws, 49
RUTGERS L. REV 403, 431 (1997) (providing an overview of the concept of
computational complexity).
53
Id. at 435–36 (giving a similar example that demonstrates exponential and
factorial growth).
54
A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/ch1.htm [https://perma.cc/4FUR-HYJE].
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emergency. Subsequent investigation determined that the indicator
light for the pump responsible for the chain of events that led to the
eventual disaster communicated ambiguous information that misled
the facility staff as they tried to figure out why the power plant was
malfunctioning. 55 As Don Norman, Emeritus Professor and Director
of the University of California San Diego Design Lab explained:
“[t]he control room and computer interfaces at Three Mile Island
could not have been more confusing if they had tried.”56
The August 21, 2017 collision of the Navy destroyer John S.
McCain presents a more recent, and more poignantly tragic,
example of the complexity and stakes of design decisions. The
National Transportation Safety Board’s (“NTSB”) report on that
incident identifies “the design of the destroyer’s Integrated Bridge
and Navigation System” (“IBNS”) as one of the factors contributing
to the collision, and finds that “the design of the John S. McCain’s
touch-screen steering and thrust control system increased the
likelihood of the operator errors that led to the collision.”57
Moreover, the report focuses extensively on issues relating to
operational procedures and crew training that are directly related to
the design of the IBNS.58 As documented in a subsequent ProPublica
report, the IBNS design failures eerily echo the design failures at
Three Mile Island: an easily-overlooked pop-up window indicated
which station had steering and thrust control at any given time.59 In
a more modern twist, the use of touch-screens added additional
55

Pulkit Verma, 3 Button Designs from 3 Different Decades That Almost
Results in Catastrophe, UX COLLECTIVE (Oct. 18, 2019), https://uxdesign.cc/3button-designs-from-3-different-decades-that-almost-results-in-catastrophe9ac65498c9c4 [https://perma.cc/Z57C-7GWY].
56
Id.
57
NAT’L. TRANSP. SAFETY BD., MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/MAR-1901
COLLISION BETWEEN US NAVY DESTROYER JOHN S MCCAIN AND TANKER ALNIC MC
SINGAPORE STRAIT, 5 MILES NORTHEAST OF HORSBURGH LIGHTHOUSE 33 (2019),
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1901.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3EF-H6SV] [hereinafter NTSB].
58
Id. at 33–34.
59
See T. Christian Miller et al., Collision Course, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://features.propublica.org/navy-uss-mccain-crash/navy-installed-touchscreen-steering-ten-sailors-paid-with-their-lives/ [https://perma.cc/ND76-BNAB].
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complexity. As noted by the NTSB report, “the touch-screen throttle
controls deprived the lee helmsman of tactile feedback when the
throttles were unganged and mismatched,” which was likely another
contributing factor to the incident.60
Both of these tragedies are examples of “normal accidents” ––a
term first coined by Charles Perrow.61 The core of Perrow’s insight
into “normal accidents” is that they are an inevitable part of any
sufficiently complex, tightly coupled system. Perrow specifically
considered the potential for these accidents in systems with a high
catastrophic potential––Three Mile Island was his motivating
example––to argue that society must either accept the inevitable
tragedies that accompany complex systems such as these or abandon
them. His basic insight, that complex systems will behave in
unpredictable and at times undesirable ways and that their creators
cannot design this characteristic out of them, generalizes across any
complex system.
Almost all software is a complex system, subject to the analysis
above. Consider, alone, the challenges that websites face in
standardizing their user interface across different web browsers and
operating systems. Although the problem is less severe now due to
browsers relying on more standardized rendering engines, for the
first decade or two of the world wide web, it was a common
phenomenon for a website to only work well on one browser and
one operating system (typically Windows with Internet Explorer).
Websites functioning only on certain browsers and operating
systems was not the result of a nefarious plan on the part of web
developers, but was, rather, the result of developers making design
decisions under imperfect conditions.62 The rendering engines of
different browsers often made it difficult to perfectly render the
same user interface in the same manner across every browser and
60

NTSB, supra note 57, at 33.
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES 5 (Princeton Univ. Press rev. ed. 2011).
62
See Tom Warren, Chrome is Turning into the New Internet Explorer 6, THE
VERGE (Jan. 4, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/4/16805216
/google-chrome-only-sites-internet-explorer-6-web-standards [https://perma.cc/
2RUZ-FES9].
61
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operating system combination.63 Thus, websites frequently would
have problems with certain sections not rendering correctly,
functionality missing, or scripts not executing as expected.
With the entrance of mobile phones and tablets, the problem has
been made more complicated. Designers now face the challenge of
designing interfaces to run on multiple browsers running on multiple
classes of devices with dramatically different user interfaces—both
in terms of display and input––across desktops, laptops, tablets, and
phones. Sometimes, firms have the resources to customize their
interfaces for many combinations of devices and browsers, but this
is often not the case. Thus, designers create interfaces that attempt
to average out the differences across device and browser
combinations or choose to focus on certain more popular or
higher-value combination to the exclusion of others.64 These
concerns are compounded by the presence of different types of
users––both in terms of soft characteristics like preferences and
harder characteristics like age and disability.
It is nigh impossible to design an interface that accommodates
any given set of user preferences and system requirements perfectly.
Additionally, the more variables that designers try to accommodate,
the more complex the system becomes—with the result that the
better a job a designer tries to do in delivering a satisfactory
experience to all users, the more likely it becomes that the system
will fail catastrophically.
Of course, the degree of catastrophe between Three Mile Island
and a website recommending the wrong product to a shopper is not
truly comparable. It is nonetheless the case, though, that the
underlying causes of many seemingly “dark patterns” may be as
innocent and inevitable as the Three Mile Island accident.
Marco Tabini, Why Some Websites Don’t Work Properly in Your Favorite
Browser, MACWORLD (Jan. 10, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.macworld.
com/article/2023682/why-some-websites-dont-work-properly-in-your-favoritebrowser.html [https://perma.cc/4HQF-U58D].
64
See CLAIRE ROWLAND ET AL., DESIGNING CONNECTED PRODUCTS: UX FOR
THE CONSUMER INTERNET OF THINGS 337 (2015) (“In systems where functionality
and interactions are distributed across more than one device, it’s not enough to
design individual UIs in isolation. Designers need to create a coherent UX across
all the devices with which the user interacts.”).
63
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However, the sometimes-innocuous nature of dark patterns is
not to excuse the myriad of truly inexcusable deceptive dark patterns
that many firms unquestionably use. A firm that programs its system
to provide false information to a user knowing that the user may act
upon that information is not an example of a normal accident, or the
sort of design mishap that results from the complex nature of
systems. On the other hand, this example is a cautionary story about
inserting regulators or regulation into the design process. Such
regulatory intervention increases complexity, sometimes
dramatically. Importantly, the potential for added complexity due to
regulation is not a reason to avoid design-related regulation—it is,
however, a reason to regulate cautiously and narrowly.
B. . . . it’s Unpredictable
Another challenge of design is that its effects can be
unpredictable. Design choices are intended to affect how human
actors interact with a system—but the human-design interface is not
mechanistic. Humans are not simple machines that respond in a
predictable, linear way to design choices on an interface. Rather,
humans are intelligent agents. Design choices present users with
information in different ways, and they make, more or less,
informed decisions based upon this information. Sometimes these
decisions are surprising; often they are unpredictable.
Efforts to use “nudges” to encourage individuals to register as
organ donors demonstrate one category of examples of this
unpredictability.65 Following the popularization of nudges in the
2000s, regulators around the world began experimenting with how
to use them to implement public policy. One such public policy was
organ donor registration. The U.K. government studies the
effectiveness of using nudges to encourage individuals to register as
organ donors through its Behavioral Insights Team. This Team
attempted to increase organ donor registration using several
different nudges. “None of these approaches was as successful as
65
See Tim Harford, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
21, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/9d7d31a4-aea8-11e3-aaa6-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cc/A2Q3-4CT8].
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the best alternatives at persuading people to sign up.”66 Indeed, one
of the approaches—using a photograph that illustrated the value of
organ donation—actually decreased organ donor registrations.67
There has been similar study of using the design of cigarette
packaging to deter smoking. One of the most commonly studied
design is the use of Graphic Warning Labels (“GWLs”) on
packaging to deter smokers. Here, too, the effects have been mixed.
Some studies, for instance, demonstrate that GWLs produce no
effect on purchasers of cigarettes, including among daily-,
occasional-, and non-smokers,68 and may even increase daily- and
occasional smokers’ positive attitudes towards smoking.69 Studies
also show that these warnings may decrease the likelihood of
nonsmokers taking up smoking.70 Perhaps most tellingly, some of
these studies show that non-smokers and smokers have different
expectations for how GWLs will affect individuals’ views towards
smoking, suggesting that designers’ expectations may not be a
sufficient guide to understand how their design decisions will affect
the users of a system.71
Other examples abound. Studies of policy interventions
designed to nudge credit card users to reduce their debt by tweaking
what information was provided to them in monthly statements
66

Id.
CABINET OFFICE, APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TO ORGAN DONATION:
PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL 5 (Dec. 23,
2013) (UK), https://www.bi.team/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Applying_Behavioural
_Insights_to_Organ_Donation_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7MW-TC33].
68
Pieter Van Dessel et al., Graphic Cigarette Pack Warnings do not Produce
More Negative Implicit Evaluations of Smoking Compared to Text-only
Warnings, PLOS ONE (Mar. 15, 2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0194627 [https://perma.cc/3PHZ-PN8L].
69
Id.; William G. Shadel et al., Do Graphic Health Warning Labels on
Cigarette Packages Deter Purchases at Point-of-Sale? An Experiment with Adult
Smokers, 34 HEALTH EDUC. RSCH. 321, 329 (Apr. 1, 2019), https://academic.
oup.com/her/article/ 34/3/321/5424102 [https://perma.cc/JZ4K-J3KE].
70
Van Dessel et al., supra note 68; Minsoo Jung, Implications of Graphic
Cigarette Warning Labels on Smoking Behavior: An International Perspective,
21 J. CANCER PREVENTION 22 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC4819662 [https://perma.cc/FE4C-6TPR].
71
Van Dessel, supra note 68.
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actually increased the amount that already-indebted users
borrowed.72 Studies of requirements that fast-food restaurants list
calorie-counts on their menus, as a means of reducing caloric intake,
have shown at best insignificant effects, and in some cases suggest
such nudges can actually increase calorie-consumption for many
lower-income consumers.73 Efforts to reduce energy consumption
by reporting how homeowners’ energy usage compared to that of
their neighbors has had a similarly ambiguous effect.74
To take yet another example, in recent years, many states have
adopted “ban-the-box” laws that prohibit allowing employers from
including a question on job applications that asks candidates
whether they have a criminal record.75 The idea behind these laws is
to give individuals with criminal records a greater chance at getting
to the interview stage of a job application—at which they can
discuss and explain their records—by preventing employers from
72

See Omri Ben-Shahar, More Failed Nudges: Evidence of Ineffective
“Behaviorally Informed” Disclosures, J. OF THINGS WE LIKE (LOTS) (Aug. 10,
2017), https://contracts.jotwell.com/more-failed-nudges-evidence-of-ineffectivebehaviorally-informed-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/N9PX-SX5L].
73
Christopher Berry et al., Understanding the Calorie Labeling Paradox in
Chain Restaurants: Why Menu Calorie Labeling Alone May Not Affect Average
Calories Ordered, 38 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 192, 195–96 (2019) (discussing
how quantity value oriented consumers may increase calories ordered based on
required menu calorie labeling).
74
Christophe Charlier et al., Under Pressure! Nudging Electricity Consumption
within Firms: Feedback from a Field Experiment 3 (Groupe de Recherche en
Droit, Economie et Gesion, Working Paper No. 2019-18, 2020), https://hal.
archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02421815/document [https://perma.cc/39WE-495N] (Fr.);
Laurent Belsie, Peer Comparisons Reduce Residential Energy Use, THE NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH, https://www.nber.org/digest /feb10/w15386.html
[https://perma.cc/6SZF-WWFP].
75
Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of
“Ban the Box”: Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When
Criminal Histories Are Hidden, 38 J. LAB. ECON. 321, 323–24 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1086/705880 [https://perma.cc/NZE6-M5VG] (“When BTB
removes information about a criminal record from job applications, employers
may respond by using the remaining observable information to try to guess who
the ex-offenders are and avoid interviewing them . . . Since young, low-skilled
black and Hispanic men are the most likely to fall into this category, employers
may respond to BTB by avoiding interviews with this group.”).
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filtering them out at a screening stage. The results of this design
intervention have also been mixed. Many employers, under the
assumption that younger African American men are more likely to
have criminal records than other potential employees, appear to be
screening out all job applications that appear to be from younger
African American men.76 The result is that, in states that adopt
ban-the-box laws, fewer African American men get jobs (whether
or not they have a criminal record) but more non-African American
men get jobs (even if they do have criminal records).77
A final example is Braess’s Paradox, which comes from the
traffic engineering literature.78 Intuitively, if a city’s roads are
congested, this congestion can be reduced by adding more roads.
Some of the cars on existing roads will move to the new roads,
which should reduce the average congestion. But, it turns out,
designing road networks is more complicated than one would
intuitively expect. Adding new roads can actually increase
congestion.79 The reason is that drivers will expect the new roads to
be less congested than the existing congested roads, so they will all
abandon the existing roads and attempt to use the new roads
instead.80 The result of adding a new road, therefore, can be to create
a tragedy of the commons in which the new road, and roads needed
to access it, face significantly increased congestion while other,
lower capacity, roads go largely unused.
There is a range of mechanisms at play across these examples.
In some cases, designers may simply not understand how users will
respond to design cues. In the case of fast-food calorie counts, for
instance, lower-income consumers, who are working to maximize
the amount of food they can get per dollar spent, may view these
counts as a useful way to maximize their caloric intake. In other
cases, the design cues may be interpreted differently by different
76

Id.
Id. at 326.
78
See generally Von D. Braess, Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung.
12 UNTERNEHMENSFORSCHUNG 258, 259 (1968) (Ger.); DAVID EASLEY & JON
KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY
CONNECTED WORLD 229, 231–32 (2010) (explaining Braess’s paradox).
79
See EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 78, at 232.
80
Id.
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user groups. Such may be the case with cigarette smokers, where
GWLs serve as a warning for non-smokers but an enticement for
existing smokers. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in predicting
outcomes arises where users respond strategically to design
decision. In the case of ban-the-box laws, employers may devise
proxies to assess the employability of job applicants that are, in fact,
worse than the information being withheld from them. Rather than
respond to the design cue as intended by the designers (that is, by
interviewing more candidates who may have criminal records), they
respond strategically by trying to filter out candidates who they
believe may have criminal records. The example of Braess’s
Paradox is an even more complicated example of strategic behavior
in response to design decision. Here, users are not only responding
to the design decision, but to how they expect other users will
respond to that decision as well.
C. . . . it’s Competitive
Product design is a key margin along which firms compete.81
Consumers desire products that are “user friendly” and “easy to
use.” Importantly, “user friendly” and “easy to use” are defined in
terms of the users, not the product designers. The story of Apple’s
success is one tale that captures this. Apple’s recent history, and the
role of design in it, is reasonably well known.82 The iPod, the iMac,
and the iPhone were all as revolutionary and successful as they were
largely due to their design. Apple took a streamlined and minimalist
approach to design, delivering products with simplified interfaces
designed to operate smoothly and intuitively. This approach served
Apple and Apple’s customers well, but it is important to note that it
does not serve all customers well.

81
Aaron Rasmussen, Software ate the World. Now it’s Design’s Turn, FAST CO.
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90454781/software-ate-theworld-now-its-designs-turn [https://perma.cc/4B46-XT7L].
82
For a recent account, focusing on the recent departure of Apple’s longtime
chief of design Jony Ive, see Chris Welch, Jony Ive Leaving Apple After Nearly
30 Years to Start New Design Firm, THE VERGE (June 27, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/27/18761736/jony-ive-apple-leave-iphonechief-design-officer-lovefrom-company-quit [https://perma.cc/TTP5-D7ST].
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Apple’s history, however, goes back far before the iPod. The
introduction of the original Macintosh computer in 1984 was
arguably even more revolutionary. It marked a transition in
computer design from computers that were designed for computer
engineers to computers that were designed for ordinary users. It
could be used by anyone without specialized training. It included
basic applications that did most of the things that ordinary users
wanted, in ways that most of them understood: simple word
processing, simple graphics editing, simple file management, and a
simple graphical interface.
But this simplicity––both from the Macintosh era and the iPod
era––comes at a cost. Apple products are exceptionally good at
doing what they are designed to do, but part of creating such
products is “locking them down.” They can be relatively difficult to
customize or to configure for applications unanticipated by Apple’s
design. The result is that some users rather dislike Apple products.
The competition for the personal computer in the 1980s was largely
between locked-down architectures like Apple’s and open
architectures like the IBM compatible PC. The competition on
mobile devices today is largely between the closed-platform iPhone
and open-platform Android devices.
To take but one recent example, most modern computers are
designed to operate in various high- and lower-power modes.
High-power modes may drain batteries, generate lots of heat, and
require the use of noisy fans. Lower-power modes may slow down
system performance and leave computers feeling sluggish and
nonresponsive. Apple has historically designed its computers so that
they will not feel sluggish, even if this causes reduced battery life or
the need to run fans to cool down the computer’s internal
components.83 Users are not able to override these settings––for
83

Marco Arment, Low Power Mode for Mac Laptops: Making the Case Again,
MARCO.ORG (Jan. 13, 2020) https://marco.org/2020/01/13/macos-low-powermode-redux [https://perma.cc/MCU8-A4J7] (explaining that “[m]odern
[computer] hardware constantly pushes thermal and power limits, trying to strike
a balance that minimizes noise and heat while maximizing performance and
battery life,” but that “Apple’s customers don’t usually have control over these
balances, and they’re usually fixed at design time,” and “Mac laptops need Low
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instance, a user who wants to slow down the computer in order to
maintain battery life is not able to do this on most Apple computers.
PC users, on the other hand, have significant control over their
computers’ power consumption. The result is that it is harder to
properly configure a PC, and its performance may more likely not
be satisfactory to the user, but when the user does want to alter that
performance, they are able to do so.84 These design considerations
echo the discussions above that product design is complicated and
unpredictable––they also demonstrate the competitive nature of
design decisions. Apple differentiates its products by making them
easier to use and ensuring that they always run smoothly, which
comes at the cost of users potentially having less control and poorer
battery life when needed. PCs, on the other hand, offer less
convenience but greater control. Consumers are better served by a
market that gives them both options––particularly because no
product exists that offers both the simple interface of an Apple
computer but the configurability of a PC. Indeed, it may not be
possible for such a product to exist.
Neither of these approaches is necessarily better or worse than
the other. To the contrary, these design elements define how the
platforms compete. Apple provides a more consistent, uniform, and
in some ways limited, set of product features, and affords greater
integration across its ecosystem of products. Android and PCs are
less consistent, but support a wider range of hardware and
applications, and generally require more complicated tools for
cross-device integration. Different users prefer differently designed
systems. The fact that there are multiple, different, competing
designs makes all users better off.
It is also important to consider the development process that is
popular among technology producers. Given the complexity of
design, the initial version of new products rarely supports a full
range of features, platforms, and users. It is prohibitively expensive
to develop fully-featured software in an initial release, particularly
given the high failure rate of new products. Rather, firms develop an
Power Mode,” which allows users “to greatly extend their battery life when they
know they’ll need it.”).
84
Id.
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initial release targeting a specific cohort for entry—perhaps a
hypothetical typical customer, or perhaps a specific type of customer
that the firm thinks is suitable to target for the product’s initial
launch. Once the product has achieved a minimum successful
launch, the design can be incrementally modified to support wider
or more specific user bases.
This model of software design has distinct benefits. It enables
rapid delivery of new goods and services to market, and it enables
competition from smaller firms. Introducing requirements that a
design must be “complete” before release––however that is
determined––would make entry difficult or impossible for many
potential entrepreneurs. Further, even the products of medium and
large firms would be negatively affected by requiring completed
designs. The rapid prototyping process works the same for both
small and large firms.
In the context of dark patterns, these observations urge two types
of caution. First, what may appear to be a “dark pattern” may merely
be a design artifact. A product may have been designed for one user
cohort or for one interface and may currently be used by other users
or on other devices. The default settings for an initial user base may
not be the same as may be expected for the expanded user base, and
it may appear that the platform is designed to push users into
disadvantageous decisions. Or, an interface that was designed, for
instance, to run on desktop or laptop computers, may be awkward to
use on a mobile device in ways that, again, seem to be
intentionally-designed dark patterns. On the other side of this coin,
requiring firms to “completely” design systems prior to launching
them is, at best, a burden that is detrimental to competition and, at
worst, impossible. Such a requirement would dramatically increase
the cost of developing new products and bringing them to market,
disproportionately hampering smaller competitors. And it would
make these firms liable for unanticipated uses of their products.
A better approach to addressing concerns like this is to rely on
competition. Customers are generally keenly aware of design issues.
There is little better way to drive customers away from a product
than for it to have an awkward, cumbersome, or “unfriendly”
interface. Where firms are able to compete, and especially where
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there is evidence that firms compete, regulation over design
elements or design decisions is likely undesirable except in the rarest
cases of overtly intentional or exceptionally harmful design patterns.
V.
PATTERNS OF REGULATING DESIGN
None of the discussion above is meant to argue that dark patterns
may not be used in problematic ways––or that they are, in fact, being
used in problematic ways. There is, without a doubt, plenty of bad
conduct happening, both online and off. Industry behavior in this
regard is frequently disappointing. The question becomes what
should be done about bad conduct, particularly given the difficulties
of distinguishing between good and bad design practices, the
potential for competitive pressures to address some of these
concerns, and the danger of poor regulation exacerbating already
difficult design challenges. The solution is made even more
complicated in the online setting where so many parts of the
ecosystem continue to change. To the extent industry standards and
self-regulation presents viable solutions to these concerns, such
mechanisms are yet in their infancy. Given time, such mechanisms
may address many of the concerns of dark patterns––or they may
not.
In other words, the point of the above is that regulators need to
be careful in how and why they regulate these practices, including
understanding when and whether they should at all. In some cases,
regulatory efforts may be better focused on other areas. In some
cases, it may make more sense to allow the underlying technology
and markets to continue to improve before stepping in with
regulatory intervention. In other cases, still, beneficial regulatory
intervention may simply not be possible.
A. Assessing the Problem
There is little empirical evidence about the extent of the dark
patterns as a problem––meaning both the incidence of use of dark
patterns, the effectiveness of those patterns, and ultimately, the
extent to which use of these patterns actually harms consumers. The
literature cited above, such as recent studies showing that various
dark patterns are being used on shopping websites and that these
patterns can be effective at increasing the likelihood of consumers
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taking actions that they otherwise would not, are compelling
evidence that there is reason to be concerned.85 But demonstrating
that something may be a problem is not the same as demonstrating
that it is, in fact, a problem. As discussed above, the literature on
using nudges to control user behavior demonstrates that the effects
of such tools are unpredictable.86
Indeed, there is evidence that tools such as dark patterns are most
likely to be effective where their potential harms are least, and least
likely to be effective when their potential harms are significant.
Behavioral psychology literature studying the effects of disclosure
rules in high-stakes transactions, such as home mortgages, have
found that regulation of disclosures––effectively the design of how
and what information is presented to consumer borrowers––have
little to no effect on borrowing behavior.87 The paradox illustrated
by that literature raises questions about whether regulation of dark
patterns is justified. If the effect is only limited to low-value
transactions, the impact on consumers may not be sufficient to
justify regulation that may or may not prove effective. Accordingly,
if the concern is that firms use dark patterns to extract small,
additional revenue from a large number of consumers that may be
particularly at-risk of exploitation, caution may be particularly
warranted. Increasing regulatory compliance costs on these firms
could result in the firms leaving markets entirely, and leaving those
consumers entirely unserved, rather than incurring compliance costs
and facing potential enforcement actions if they do not comply
correctly. In an imperfect world, regulations must accordingly be

85
See Mathur et al., supra note 3 (presenting data showing widespread use of
some categories of dark patterns on shopping websites); see generally Luguri &
Strahievitz, supra note 31 (showing that dark patterns can be effectively used in
some cases to manipulate user behaviour).
86
See Thaler, supra note 2; see also Luguri & Strahievitz, supra note 31, at 37–
38.
87
See, e.g., Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage
Credit Regulation (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harv. Univ., Working Paper, Paper
No. UCC08-12, 2009), https:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121199
[https://perma.cc/TM7U-ZWRH] (explaining that when consumers lack an
understanding of mortgage transactions, increased disclosures may be ineffectual).
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judged by their likely real-world effects, not against a world of
costless and perfectly effective regulation.88
It is also unclear how much of this behavior is fraudulent or
deceptive, and how much of it is simply advertising by another
name. Calling a shopper’s attention to a complementary product
during a checkout flow could be called trickery, but it is not clear
how it is materially different than showing the user an advertisement
they need to dismiss when they land on the site’s home page. On the
other hand, practices like cramming, slamming, and “sneaking into
cart” are much more likely to be harmful because the transaction
costs of returning or cancelling unwanted items may exceed the
value that the firm extracts from the consumer, leading the consumer
to move on with their day and take the loss.
Research on the effects of dark patterns on consumers is still in
its infancy. There is not enough research today to justify any broad
regulatory undertakings that would not incur substantial risk of
unintended consequences. In all likelihood, the best regulatory
approach––to the extent that one proves to be justified––will be one
that is tailored to specific types of patterns. Such regulation could,
for instance, make specific design practices (e.g., providing
fraudulent information to consumers at or near the time of purchase)
illegal, or could, alternatively, task or empower an agency such as
the FTC to identify specific practices as violations of the FTC Act.
B. The Marketplace is Working to Address These Problems
Even as some firms take advantage of dark patterns, other firms
are voluntarily working to protect consumers from them. As
discussed above, design is a key margin along which firms
compete.89 It is arguably among the most important margins.
Google, for instance, banned advertisers from its network that used
pop-under ads, which it viewed as a poor design pattern providing a

88

Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. OF L.
& ECON. 1, 1–2 (1969) (elaborating on the “Nirvana Fallacy,” comparing the ideal
scenario as more efficient than the real choices presented).
89
Supra, Part IV.C.
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bad user experience.90 Most major browsers now allow users to
automatically block pop-up windows—another design practice
designed to draw users’ attention similar to windows that cannot
easily be closed. Malware and spyware frequently attempt to take
over a user’s web browsing experience via browser hijacking—the
installation of a software add-on that would permit third parties to
interfere with and observe the web browsing of a user. As of
Windows 10, Microsoft had disabled the key behavior of web
browsers that facilitated browser hijacking.
These are all examples of platform-level efforts that combat
these practices by disabling features needed to implement designs
that are particularly likely to be harmful to users. There is also effort
among industry professionals to combat the use by designers of dark
pattern techniques. For instance, at the time of this writing
twenty-seven of the first thirty results from a search for the term
“dark patterns” on Google demonstrate a widespread understanding
and condemnation of using dark patterns to trick users.91 These
search results show that designers are warning peers not to use these
and similar tactics and, where the practice may have value they offer
alternative design tools. The remaining three search results link to
more general discussions of dark patterns––these discussions all
also describe use of the approach as problematic.
Given the complexity of design, there is reason to prefer to rely
on the marketplace to address the concerns raised by dark patterns—
particularly given that this market-based approach appears to be
working. Some patterns that seem to be, or even in fact are, being
used in ways that are problematic may also have good uses. For
instance, pop-up windows are often used in problematic ways, but
some websites make good use of them. Rather than prohibit them
entirely, modern web browsers indicate to users when a website has
tried to use a pop-up window and empower users to allow them on
a case-by-case basis, for specific websites, or generally. Regulation
90
See Sarah Perez, Google Bans its Ads on Sites that use Those Annoying ‘Popunders,’ TECHCRUNCH (July 11, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/11/
google-bans-its-ads-on-sites-that-use-those-annoying-pop-unders
[https://perma.cc/8JL6-A3JE].
91
A copy of these search results is on file with UNC Journal of Law and
Technology.
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is unlikely to implement a similarly nuanced approach. Features
empowering users to control the behavior of pop-up windows was
phased in over time and across a range of browser platforms,
allowing for industry to experiment and gather data on how best to
implement this feature. Moreover, it is also notable that this feature
was implemented at the browser (platform) level. Regulation of
design features can be undertaken at various levels in the software
stack. The use and behavior of pop-up windows, for instance, could
be controlled by the web browser. The operating system could also
limit the ability of the browser to open new windows. Code that
opens new windows could be intercepted by firewalls. Finally, of
course pop-up windows can only be implemented if the
programming languages for writing web pages implement them. To
which of these layers should regulation of design patterns apply?
How does this choice affect the overall complexity of the design
ecosystem?
Indeed, even aside from this problem, there is a great deal of
value in maintaining stable interfaces, even where those interfaces
may contain some poor design. Frequent design change is itself a
dark pattern, or deviation from established design elements.
Consumers are more likely to make mistakes––or to be tricked into
doing things they would not otherwise do––if they are unfamiliar
with a design or an interface.92 Regulatory intervention into design
could force widespread redesign of interfaces, especially if
undertaken regularly or in a way that lacks the precision of changes
that industry itself may be able to make. This mass-redesign, in turn,
92

See, e.g., ROWLAND ET AL., supra note 64, at 360 (“Users should not have to
wonder whether different words, situations, or actions mean the same thing.
Follow platform conventions.”) (citation omitted); Euphemia Wong, Principles of
Consistency and Standards in User Interface Design, INTERACTION DESIGN
FOUND. (Aug. 2020) https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/principle -ofconsistency-and-standards-in-user-interface-design [https://perma.cc/A43F-CQXH]
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could have widespread adverse effects on consumers. Again, this is
not to say that regulation is unwarranted or not possible—only that
it must be undertaken with care and with due consideration of
alternatives such as industry standardization (which would increase
stability, both over time and across websites) and self-regulation.
C. The Sufficiency of Existing Law
Existing law is sufficient to address many, possibly most, of the
concerns raised by dark patterns. Most of the egregious dark patterns
should fall within the ambit of the FTC’s consumer protection
authority. To the extent that they are harmful, most of these patterns
involve making representations or engaging in practices that are
designed to deceive consumers. Such conduct is covered by Section
5 of the FTC Act’s prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts and
practices.93 In order to make out such a claim, the FTC Act, and the
FTC’s subsequently adopted Policy Statement on Deception,94
require that the Commission must establish that the practice is likely
to mislead the ordinary, reasonable consumer in a way that is
material, causing injury to that consumer.95 The Commission
“presume[s] that express claims are material.”96 Thus, the
Commission needs only to demonstrate injury—i.e., that a
reasonable consumer did, in fact, make purchases that they
otherwise would not have—to take action against firms employing
design practices (dark patterns), such as falsely asserting that a
certain number of people have recently purchased a product or that
a specific limited number of units remain available for sale. Other
practices, such as obscuring how to close a window, may require
that a more substantial evidentiary burden be met by the
Commission.

93

15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (1983),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014d
eceptionstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5SF-ZPYY].
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Id. at 1–2, 4.
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Should the FTC decide to act against firms making use of dark
patterns, there are several approaches that it could take. In general,
like most regulatory agencies, the FTC has both adjudicative and
rulemaking authorities, as provided for under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”)97 —though its rulemaking authority has
been modified by the Magnusson-Moss Act and is more involved
than the traditional APA rulemaking procedures.98 In general, the
Commission may bring an administrative enforcement action to
enjoin any conduct that the Commission determines violates Section
5, after an investigation and administrative hearing.99 It may also
seek damages for such action in federal court for conduct that “a
reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was
dishonest or fraudulent.”100 It may also issue rules that “define with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”101 Once enacted, it can enforce
such rules through administrative action or directly in federal court,
seeking both injunctive relief or damages.102
In recent decades, the FTC has been reluctant to engage in
rulemaking proceedings, due largely to misunderstandings of both
the FTC Act and general administrative law dating back to important
judicial losses in the 1980s––however, this does not mean that it
lacks such authority.103 Given the broad, and generally unexplored,
97

See 5 U.S.C. § 500.
See 15 U.S.C. § 57a. These procedures were amended in 1975 by the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, Pub. L. 93-637 to facilitate heightened Congressional oversight of FTC
rules relative to ordinary rulemaking procedures under the APA.
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15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
100
Id. § 57b(a)(2).
101
Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
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Id. §§ 45(b), 57b(a)(1).
103
See generally, Justin Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of Administrative
Antitrust, 76 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 209, 239 (2014) (noting that high-profile losses
in federal circuit courts contributed to decreased FTC rulemaking); see also Fed.
Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, Comment of Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit
Chopra: Hearing #1 on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21 st Century
8
(2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf [https:// perma.cc/6FUD98
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depth of the FTC’s authority directly relevant to the practice of dark
patterns, it would be preferable for the FTC to take the lead in
developing rules relating to regulation of dark patterns. It only
makes sense for legislative approaches to be explored should the
FTC’s authority prove insufficient to the task.
It also bears noting that, in addition to authority that the FTC
has, it is established law that consent obtained through material
deception is not valid.104 Many dark patterns exploit the boundaries
of consent. But this issue is broader than the issue of dark patterns,
relating, for instance, to contracts of adhesion, the process of
contract formation in the online setting, and the enforceability of
contracts that are generally known to go unread. These are topics of
significant and ongoing (arguably endless) discussion—to the extent
that legislative attention should be given to this issue, it should focus
on the validity of consent, not on the sub-issue of dark patterns.
On the other side of the regulatory equation is concern that some
efforts to regulate dark patterns may run headlong into the First
Amendment.105 The threshold question is whether design decisions
constitute expression protected by the First Amendment. There is
ample reason to believe that regulation of interface design could
trigger First Amendment scrutiny, at least in some cases. The most
CFMN] (observing that the FTC has “largely neglected” its rulemaking
capabilities).
104
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B (A.L.I. 1979) (discussing cases
where courts held consent procured through fraudulent means invalid); see also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163 (A.L.I. 1981) (discussing cases where
fraudulent inducement allowed the rescission of contracts).
105
See, e.g., Mark MacCarthy, Online Manipulation is the Latest Data
Protection, CIO (Aug. 14, 2018) https://www.cio.com/article/3297536/onlinemanipulation-is-the-latest-data-protection-debate.html [https://perma.cc/KF4LKHDG] (arguing that “calls for prohibition [of dark patterns] might threaten
activities protected by the First Amendment”); see also VALERIE C. BRANNON,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10309, REGULATING BIG TECH: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 4
(2019) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10309.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SBKFGSP] (discussing various regulatory proposals relating to “big tech,” including
the DETOUR Act, and noting that “[a]ny of the general proposals discussed in
this Sidebar could raise First Amendment concerns, depending on the precise
contours of a given regulation.”).
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poignant case is likely Reed v. Town of Gilbert,106 in which the
Supreme Court found a city’s “sign code” to be a content-based
regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny.107 “Sign
codes” are laws that regulate the use, placement, and design of
signs—such as the temporary signs placed along streets announcing
the opening and location of a new church.108 To use the facts of Reed
as an example, sign codes are a physical-world analogy to a
hypothetical law purporting to regulate the use, placement, or other
design elements of a computer interface.
The application of Reed in the context of dark patterns should
not be over-stated. Reed does not say that all design is speech, that
it is necessarily subject to strict scrutiny, or that it necessarily cannot
be regulated. The sign code at issue in Reed applied differently to
different users of those signs, such that the Court found it was
regulating the speech of different speakers differently.109 A more
general, content-neutral, regulation would likely not face strict
scrutiny—though it may face intermediate scrutiny. Moreover,
while the case clearly demonstrates that regulation of some design
elements or decisions may constitute speech, this does not mean that
all design elements are speech, nor does it provide clear guidance on
when they do. Rather, in Reed the Court focuses on the fact of the
signs’ “communicative content” to determine that the sign code
made content-based distinctions.110 To the extent that design
elements lack communicative content, they are more likely to fall
outside the scope of First Amendment protections.
But the concern also should not be minimized. Most concerns
about dark patterns arise in the commercial context—where the
concern is, in effect, that firms are using design elements to
influence decisions about whether and what to purchase. The
Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial speech has become
controversial and confused in recent years, following both Reed and
106

107

576 U.S. 155 (2015).

Id. at 159.
Id.
109
Id. at 164.
110
Id. at 163.
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the earlier Sorrell case.111 Whereas commercial speech has long been
understood to face less Constitutional protection than most other
forms of speech,112 recent cases like Sorrell and Reed suggest that
regulations that subject commercial speech to distinct rules make
content-based distinctions and are therefore subject to “heightened
scrutiny.”113 Prior to these cases, the longstanding understanding
was that commercial speech, which would likely include decisions
about design elements of commercial products, to the extent that
they constitute speech at all, were subject to the most modest of First
Amendment protections.114
The purpose of this argument is not to say that design decisions
necessarily constitute speech or that regulation of those decisions
necessarily implicates First Amendment concerns or review. There
are ample examples of laws that regulate aspects of design that have
survived First Amendment challenges—or that simply are
longstanding regulations which have not been challenged as raising
First Amendment concerns. Food and drug labels are highly
regulated, as is disclosure of various financial information by banks
and lenders. Fuel economy information is regulated. Different types
of vehicles are required to bear different types of information
disclosures. States often regulate how prices are disclosed.
Additionally, of course, it is illegal to sell mattresses as new without
a standardized tag.
In light of cases like Sorrell and Reed, the delineation between
design regulations that do and do not implicate First Amendment
111

Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980).
113
The Court in Sorrell applies what it calls “heightened scrutiny,” which is not
clearly the same as the Court’s more traditional standards of either intermediate
or strict scrutiny. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557, 565, 566. For discussion of the Court’s
evolving understanding of commercial speech, see Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 178 (2016); see also Caitlin E. Jokubaitis, There
and Back: Vindicating the Listener’s Interests in Targeted Advertising in the
Internet Information Economy, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 85, 95 (2018); Thomas
A. Zelante, Jr., Paper or Plastic: Speech in an Unlikely Place, 48 SETON HALL L.
REV. 931, 932 (2018).
114
That is, the commercial speech standard established under Central Hudson,
447 U.S. 557.
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concerns is unclear. Any attempt to regulate design decisions should
be undertaken with awareness that such regulations could raise such
concerns.
Importantly, in cases where the First Amendment does apply,
regulations of purported dark patterns could well face trouble—even
under the more forgiving standards of intermediate scrutiny. As
discussed in Part II, design is hard to do well and the effects of
design decisions can be hard to predict. Assuming the courts find
that regulators have a sufficiently important interest in regulating
design decisions, it may be difficult to demonstrate that those
regulations are not either underinclusive or overinclusive, let alone
that they are sufficiently tailored to address the underlying interest
justifying the regulation.115 A regulation that encumbers protected
speech, while failing to curtail the speech that the government has a
sufficient interest in restraining, is very likely to be struck down by
the courts. Courts are particularly likely to rule against regulations
when there are less restrictive means of addressing those concerns,
such as relying on market forces that appear to be responsive to
those same concerns.116
D. Better Approaches than Regulation: New Technologies and
Self-Regulation
To the extent that existing legal rules are insufficient to address
harms from dark patterns, it is likely either because the conduct is
not clearly harmful or those patterns may at times be beneficial. If
such is the case, the conduct likely should not be prohibited.
Nonetheless, dark patterns are a reasonable area of legislative
concern where regulation, either today or in the future, may be
warranted.
Should regulation be desired, a few ideas to keep in mind when
approaching regulation in the area of dark patterns are discussed
below. Importantly, many of these ideas are intended to only
115

RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING § 2:4 (2019)
(explaining that the government must “demonstrate ‘important’ or ‘substantial’
justifications for its actions and . . . a ‘substantial nexus’ or a ‘narrow tailoring’ of
ends to means”).
116
See supra Part IV.C (discussing the competitive market forces that govern
design decisions).
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regulate patterns indirectly, or by enabling new ways that users may
identify, avoid, or respond to potentially harmful design practices.
Dark patterns are well-suited to industry self-regulation, where
standardized industry practices are given some presumption of being
inoffensive, but entities deviating from those practices bear a burden
of demonstrating that their design choices are in the interest of
consumers. Importantly, and contrary to the understanding
demonstrated by some members of the House Subcommittee,
industry self-regulation emphatically does not mean non-regulation.
Self-regulation carries with it an expectation that an industry will, in
fact, endeavor to limit harmful conduct. Specifically, this includes
an expectation that the industry will take action against industry
participants who eschew the norms of the industry, and that industry
will expect regulators to take action against it if it fails to do so. Both
categories of sanction may be formal or informal, and may be
internally or externally imposed. At the least formal end of the
spectrum, an industry’s customary practices may be considered by
courts as persuasive evidence of the appropriateness of a member of
that industry’s conduct. If interface designers have standard
practices, and particularly if they have a presumption against the use
of certain patterns, this is compelling evidence for a court to
consider. More formally, many industries and professions have
formal self-governance bodies, such as medical licensing boards or
financial oversight entities. Participation in the industry requires
membership in one of these bodies, and the bodies are expected to
police the conduct of their members.
As discussed above, industry is, and has consistently been,
working to improve the status quo and deter the use of pernicious
dark patterns.117 The most viable approach would likely be to allow
firms to use contemporaneous documentation––that is,
documentation supporting design decisions at the time those
decisions were made––to demonstrate that design decisions were
made with the interest of consumers and users in mind. Such a factor
could be influential both for the development of standardized
industry practices as well as for firms that deviate from those
practices, by placing an expressly consumer-focused research and
117

See Thaler, supra note 2; see also Luguri & Strahievitz, supra note 31, at 37–38.
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development element at the heart of the design practice. Such
documentation would tend to suggest that pro-consumer
justifications exist for design decisions. Moreover, to the extent that
designers are not concerned with consumer experience today––such
as if they are focused more narrowly on designs that are appealing
on technological or aesthetic grounds but that may, in fact, be
detrimental to the user experience of products––it would create a
strong incentive for designers and industry groups to focus expressly
on the effects of design decisions on consumers.
If it proves to be the case that the FTC is unable to act against
specific design practices that it believes to be harmful to consumers,
it still has multiple paths of response. First, it could engage in a
rulemaking proceeding to develop rules to proscribe specific
practices. Its authority in this area is broad, if not often used.
Alternatively, it could report to Congress on these issues to seek
statutory authorization to address specific practices. Indeed, dark
patterns may be an area well-suited to the development of an
expedited review and rulemaking process, such as that developed in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) for the review of
circumvention technologies.118 For instance, the FTC could be
tasked with periodically reporting to Congress on practices that it
sees that have the potential to harm consumers but fall outside of its
existing statutory authority. Or it could be tasked by Congress with
producing a periodic study on specific problematic practices,
including the establishment of a mechanism for reporting practices
to be investigated. This could be used to support injunctive or other
enforcement actions against firms engaging in those practices.
Ideas such as these would bolster the FTC’s authority in this area
without need for the enactment of a substantial new regulatory
regime or enactment of ossifying laws. In general, the FTC should
be encouraged to explore the limits of its authority to address these
concerns, including through narrow legislative interventions such as
discussed above, or through FTC-generated reports on these issues,
before implementing new, congressionally-crafted, regulatory
regimes. Importantly, administrative remedies should be limited to
injunctions, with civil penalties only available through the federal
118
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courts. And, except in a case of clearly intentional fraudulent
behavior––such as what would already be covered under existing
Section 5 authority––the preferred initial remedy should be for firms
to forego the problematic conduct in order to improve the overall
standard of conduct of the industry in a non-adversarial manner.
More generally, regulators should focus greater attention on the
causes of problematic practices rather than on the reasons that those
practices are concerning. Understanding why certain practices are
harmful may allow for the identification of new ways to mitigate
that harm. It may often be the case that it is preferable to enable new
forms of conduct that allow consumers and users to mitigate harm
than to try to prohibit the existing, potentially harmful, conduct
directly. Where the effects of design decisions may be ambiguous,
benefiting some users while potentially harming others, regulations
that focus on allowing users to mitigate harm, rather than prohibiting
that harm outright may be more suitable.
To the extent the law proscribes certain designs, it must do so
carefully, including thinking about what alternative designs may be
adopted––both legitimate and illegitimate ones. As discussed above,
design is hard119 ––these are complex systems––and any regulation
puts regulators in the shoes of the designers. What is more, it ossifies
design.
Finally, given that many dark patterns are used both online and
offline, and more generally that the concerns created by dark
patterns are not unique to the online setting, Congress should
consider whether the scope of its interest in this area should be
limited to the online setting. For instance, many firms engage in
practices that make it difficult to cancel service or return products.
To the extent that concern is justified about analogous online
practices, it does not make sense to cabin that concern––or any
exploration of it through reports or regulation––to the online setting.
If new rules are adopted, regulators should consider whether any
proscribed practices should be limited to online actors or whether
there should be rules of more general applicability.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
Concern about “dark patterns” is old wine in new bottles.
However, it is a good vintage of concern: many practices decried as
dark patterns are easy analogs of long proscribed business practices.
Moreover, even those that are not clearly the online equivalents of
already-proscribed offline conduct are, if harmful to consumers,
very likely to fall within the FTC’s existing statutory authority to act
against Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices. Congress should
push the FTC to use its existing authority to protect consumers
against these harms before undertaking any novel legislative
experiments. Should the FTC’s authority prove insufficient, its
efforts in discovering this will provide valuable information for any
subsequent legislative efforts––and those efforts will, in all
likelihood, be best focused on augmenting the FTC’s existing
authority to cover this area of concern.
This cautious approach is advisable on simple prudential
grounds. Congress should turn first to existing statutory authority
before overlying new, potentially conflicting or confusing, layers to
the regulatory fabric. But it is especially advisable in the context of
dark patterns because there is nothing inherently “dark” about these
practices. As discussed throughout this Article, the reality of design
is that it is hard to do well and the effects of simple design decisions
can be complex and difficult to predict. Patterns that are “dark” for
some users may be beneficial for others. Patterns that appear “dark”
to casual observers may actually have few or no adverse effects at
all. And mandating alternative designs may, in fact, yield
substantially worse effects for many users.
It is undeniably the case that many firms are using interface
design for questionable or harmful purposes. It has been empirically
demonstrated both that firms are engaging in these practices and that
these practices can affect user decision-making. But, this reality
alone does not demand legislative or regulatory innovation in
response. On one hand, almost all of the documented practices that
are clearly problematic can also clearly be addressed by the FTC
using its existing authority. And on the other hand, there is reason
to believe that the market is an effective check on these practices.
Design is one of the chief margins along which firms compete
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online, and design professionals clearly view the sort of practices
animating concern about dark patterns with disdain and
disapprobation.
The design of Congress leads to patterns in how it approaches
and responds to concerns such as those raised by dark patterns––and
those patterns of Congressional response can themselves be dark,
having adverse effects for consumers. Just as Congress should be
concerned about circumstances where information or choices are
presented to users in ways that influence them into adverse
decisions, so too should Congress be concerned that it also may be
influenced into insufficiently considered regulatory decisions. There
is no lack of attention to the concern of dark patterns today. It is a
topic of active academic research, regulatory scrutiny, and
legislative appeal. It is an area of uncertain harm to consumers and
where regulatory intervention may have adverse consequences for
consumers. Lastly, it is an area where substantial, yet unexplored,
regulatory authority already exists.

106

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 1

